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Unclassified Congressional Testimony

Introductory Remarks

Mr. Chairman, honorable members of the Committee, I appreciate this opportunity to appear before you today to testify regarding the current status of Security at Department of Energy sites managed by Energy, Science and Environment (ESE) Programs. In particular, we were asked by the Chairman to focus on the readiness of the protective force, and we are pleased to do so.

As you are aware, the Office of the Under Secretary for Energy, Science and Environment is responsible for the management and operational oversight of Department of Energy programs and facilities that are not otherwise statutorily managed by the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA). These programs include the Office of Environmental Management (EM), the Office of Science (SC), the Office of Nuclear Energy, Science and Technology (NE), as well as Fossil Energy (FE), Civilian Radioactive Waste Management (OCRWM), and Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EE). DOE facilities for which ESE programs are responsible include: the Idaho National Laboratory (INL), the Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL), the Savannah River Site (SRS) and Hanford Site, as well as more than 10 additional research

laboratories and operational facilities. The security requirements at ESE sites represent over $400 million of Department of Energy's 2006 budget request

In August 2004, former Deputy Secretary McSlarrow created a temporary position of Director of Security for the Office of the Under Secretary for Energy, Science and Environment in order to provide "expert advice and assistance on security-related issues to the Under Secretary." Mr. McSlarrow directed that this position "serve as a focal point for all ESE security activities and provide a clear interface between ESE and the Office of Security and Safety Performance Assurance (SSA)." I was assigned to that position by the Deputy Secretary at that time.

On July 3 of this year, Under Secretary David Garman formalized the position of Director of Security for ESE Programs within the Office of Under Secretary. The creation and formalization of this position ensures that the Office of the Under Secretary for ESE will now have a focal point for ESE and DOE security issues and that ESE will more effectively participate in Department-wide security management decisions with counterparts in SSA and NNSA. This further ensures that ESE will maintain its share of DOE's security partnership between our organization, DOE's policy organization (SSA) and security operations within NNSA. This partnership is extremely important in order for DOE to ensure sound and balanced management oversight over the Department's security programs. I can assure you that we are very cognizant of the security challenges which we face in a post "9/11" threat environment, and Under Secretary Garman, together with Secretary Bodman and Deputy Secretary Sell are all personally engaged

and fully committed to ensuring that those challenges are met for the entire DOE complex.

Energy, Science and Environment Security (ESE) Program Offices are responsible for the management, operation, and oversight of a variety of DOE sites involving a wide range of activities including energy, biological and environmental science research, environmental cleanup, and nuclear engineering and technology. ESE's responsibilities include management of four principal sites (Hanford, Savannah River, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, and Idaho National Laboratory) which contain some quantities of Category I Special Nuclear Material and which were the focus of a recent review by the Government Accountability Office (GAO). We are here today, in part, to provide information related to the findings contained in that report.

First, it is important to state that the Department of Energy is extremely proud of the men and women who constitute the protective forces which are responsible for protecting DOE facilities and assets on a daily basis. We hear regularly from a variety of government auditors and investigators from a number of organizations such as GAO, Congressional staff offices, the Inspector General's Office and the Office of Independent Oversight that they are all favorably impressed with the overall professionalism and dedication of our protective force officers. These officers are DOE's first line of defense against any act of aggression by any number of malevolent sources and we believe that they do an outstanding job on a regular basis.

At Energy, Science and Environment (ESE) sites, over 1,000 protective force officers routinely provide protection at four major facilities housing Category I Special Nuclear Materials. We believe that the officers assigned to these ESE sites including Hanford, Savannah River, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, and Idaho National Laboratory are among the best trained, best equipped, and most responsive of any across the DOE complex. One indication of the overall readiness of ESE protective forces is the fact that special police officer teams from two ESE sites placed first and second at this year's annual Security Protection Officer Training Competition (SPOTC) held this year from June 5 through 9 at Albuquerque, New Mexico. The team from the Savannah River Site finished in first place among 11 teams representing ESE and NNSA sites from across the country, with the Hanford Patrol team placing second in the overall competition. In addition, this year's Police Officer of the year, Ryan Strader, hails from Savannah River with his Savannah River colleague, Allen Ford placing second in the overall individual competition.

The Office of the Under Secretary for ESE is extremely proud of the significant accomplishments by these outstanding officers.

GAO Report Observations

Please allow me at this point to provide several comments on the recent report provided to you by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) entitled "DOE's Office of Energy, Science and Environment Needs to Take Prompt Action to Meet the New Design

Basis Threat." GAO conducted this review at four ESE sites from late 2004 through early 2005. The focus of this review was to determine whether DOE/ESE protective forces were able to meet current threats as set forth in DOE's most recent Design Basis Threat, whether they were sufficiently trained and equipped and to evaluate their level of confidence as to their ability to perform their assigned duties.

In general, GAO found that DOE/ESE protective forces do currently meet established readiness requirements, that officers are confident in their overall readiness and level of preparedness to execute their duties, that they generally meet all DOE training and equipment requirements, and in most cases, either carry or have access to standard protective force equipment.

However, GAO did note some weaknesses in protective force requirements and practices at ESE sites which I will address briefly at this time:

Force-on-Force Participation

During their review, GAO found that not all protective force members were required to participate in force-on-force exercises on a regular basis. In addition, the report found that DOE policy does not require sites to track protective force member participation in these exercises.

DOE's Office of Security and Safety Performance Assurance, which is responsible for issuing security policy, has advised that it intends to issue new policy which will ensure that protective force officers are required to participate in force-on-force exercises on a regular basis and that such participation will be required to be tracked and documented in appropriate training records at each site. We agree that this should be done.

Weaknesses in Protective Force Equipment

The review found that at some ESE sites there were deficiencies or weaknesses in protective force access to adequate equipment such as dependable radio communications, body armor, and chemical protective gear.

DOE subsequently conducted a review of protective force equipment at each ESE site in each of the areas identified by GAO. We believe we have substantially improved or corrected all deficiencies identified and that all ESE sites are currently in compliance with DOE policy regarding protective force equipment requirements.

Implementation Planning for the 2004 Design Basis Threat Requirements

GAO recommended that DOE/ESE develop Department-wide implementation plans for meeting the requirements of the 2004 Design Basis Threat. DOE sites were directed in October 2004 to prepare implementation plans for submittal in July 2005. ESE implementation plans have been received and are currently in the review process. These plans are scheduled to be provided to the Deputy Secretary by the end of July 2005.

Planning for the Creation of an Elite Force

The GAO report recommended that the necessary policy revisions be undertaken to support the implementation of an Elite Force initiative.

The Office of Security and Safety Performance Assurance has advised that policy revisions regarding this initiative are currently being written and are scheduled to be submitted for final departmental approval no later than the end of December 2005.

Development and Deployment of Enhanced Security Technologies

GAO recommended that DBT implementation plans include planning for the development and deployment of enhanced security technologies.

The Department of Energy security community is committed to exploring and acquiring newer, better, and more cost effective ways to provide state of the art protection for DOE facilities. DOE's Office of Security and Safety Performance Assurance has a number of initiatives in place to ensure that these technologies are adequately reviewed, evaluated and deployed. ESE sites are evaluating use of these technologies as they prepare their Design Basis Threat Implementation Plans.

Transportation and Consolidation of Special Nuclear Material

In February 2005, the Secretary established the Nuclear Materials Disposition and Consolidation Coordinating Committee which is chartered to identify opportunities for material disposition and consolidation across the complex. Led by the Secretary's National Security Advisor, the NMDCCC is charged with considering all aspects of materials consolidation to include impacts on operations, transportation assets, and realistic schedules. Under Secretary Garman is a co-chair of the Executive Steering Group (with Ambassador Brooks from NNSA) for this initiative and ESE organizations are actively participating in the Committee's efforts to consolidate nuclear materials at fewer DOE sites.

Establishment of an ESE Security Organization

One of GAO's recommendations was for the Under Secretary for ESE to establish an organization to oversee development, implementation, and coordination of ESE and broader DOE efforts to meet the 2004 Design Basis Threat. As stated earlier in my testimony, Under Secretary Garman has, in fact, created the position of Director of Security for ESE Programs which will be responsible for the day to day management, coordination, and operational oversight of ESE security programs. This position will work closely with ESE Program Secretarial Officers and their respective security managers and will ensure appropriate interface and coordination with counterparts in the Office of Security and Safety Performance Assurance (SSA) and the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA).

This concludes my prepared remarks, Mr. Chairman. At this time, I would be pleased to respond to any questions from the Committee.